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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission denying 
unemployment compensation to Claimant-Appellant, Joan Thrall. The Commission concluded 
that Thrall was not entitled to benefits because she had voluntarily quit her employment with her 
employer, Respondent, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center ("St. Luke's"), without good cause. 
Thrall challenges the Commission's decision, contending that the Commission erred as a matter 
of law in concluding that she voluntarily quit her employment. She contends that the record 
establishes that she was forced to resign, that a forced resignation is effectively a discharge, and 
that there is insufficient evidence to support the Commission's alternate ruling that she was 
discharged for misconduct. Although Thrall attempts to frame the issues on appeal as pure legal 
issues subject to free review, a close review of her arguments reveals she is challenging several 
critical factual findings, which comprise the very foundation of the Commission's decision. 
Idaho law is clear that the Commission's factual findings may not be disturbed on appeal 
if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence; this is true, even if conflicting 
evidence exists to the contrary. Indeed, the Idaho Constitution mandates that only questions of 
law may be reviewed by this Court in an appeal of this nature, which means that the 
Commission's factual findings may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Thrall has failed 
to demonstrate the existence of clear error; thus, the Commission's decision denying her benefits 
must be upheld. 
1 
B. Statement of Facts and Relevant Proceedings 1 
The underlying facts, unless indicated otherwise, are undisputed by the parties. From 
March 2000 to October 2013, Thrall was employed by St. Luke's as a laboratory technician in 
the Boise Pathology Group, where her primary job duties included tracking patient specimens 
and inputting patient information. Agency Record ("R."), Vol. I, p. 18. During the bulk of her 
employment, Thrall made a few errors, but otherwise successfully performed her job. Id. In 
April 2013, however, she started making patient identification errors. These errors constituted a 
violation of St. Luke's policies and procedures. Id. Thrall was placed on corrective action for 
the errors. Several months later, in August 2013, she received a written warning for mislabeling 
and erroneously selecting the wrong patients on lab specimens. Id. As a result, St. Luke's 
provided Thrall with coaching and counseling. Id. Thrall noted on her written warning notice 
that she planned to improve the inputting of patient information in the future. Id. However, one 
week before her separation of employment (which occurred on October 4, 2013), Thrall was 
suspended for making another error on the job. Id. Later, on October 1, 2013, she made yet 
another error. Thrall had received a specimen identified with a patient name and birthdate. 
1 Contrary to this Court's rules, in her opening brief, Thrall provides little to no citation 
to the record to support her summary of the underlying facts. See Appellant's Opening Brief 
("Op. Br."), at pp. 4-5. The Court should find this fact especially troubling in this appeal where, 
as explained below, the burden lies with Thrall to establish that there is insufficient evidence in 
2 
There were two patients with the same name, but different birthdates in the employer's system. 
Thrall selected the wrong patient when identifying the specimen. Id. 
According to Thrall's supervisor, properly identifying patients is fundamental to 
providing safe quality patient care and laboratory results. Hearing Transcript ("Tr."), p. 14, LL. 
8-9. The failure to make a proper identification could result in the release ofresults to the wrong 
individual or release of wrong results to the right patient. Tr., p. 14, LL. 9-13. An identification 
error could also mean that a patient's history is not transferred properly if the error is not 
discovered. Tr., p. 14, LL. 13-16. 
On October 4, 2013, after returning to work from a week of suspension, Thrall met with 
her supervisors, Anne Sergeant, the assistant director of laboratory services, and Brenda 
Miranda, the lab manager. R., Vol. I, p. 19. Thrall testified that, during this meeting, her 
supervisors told her she could either resign or she would be terminated. Id. Her supervisors, on 
the other hand, testified that at no time during the October 4 meeting did they tell Thrall she 
would be terminated if she did not resign; rather, they testified that the three of them discussed 
whether resigning would be in Thrall's best interest and, after some discussion of the matter, 
Thrall eventually made the decision to resign. Id.; Tr., p. 12, L. 11 -p. 13, L. 21; Tr., p. 17, LL. 
17-22 (Sergeant testimony); Tr., p. 19, LL. 2-8 (Miranda testimony). Both Sergeant and Miranda 
the record to support the Commission's factual findings regarding how her termination from 
employment came about. 
3 
testified they believed Thrall's resignation was voluntary. Tr., p. 12, LL. 11-22 (Sergeant 
testimony); Tr., p. 19, LL. 2-8 (Miranda testimony). 
After Thrall applied for unemployment benefits, which application was denied by the 
Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL"), she appealed the IDOL's decision to an Appeals 
Examiner, who held a telephonic hearing in which testimony was received from Thrall and her 
supervisors, Sergeant and Miranda. R., Vol. I, p. 1. The Appeals Examiner issued a written 
decision concluding that Thrall had been forced to resign, the resignation must be viewed as a 
discharge, and, because the employer had failed to demonstrate that Thrall was discharged for 
misconduct, Thrall was entitled to unemployment benefits. R., Vol. I, pp. 1-5. St. Luke's 
appealed this decision to the Commission, which after conducting a de nova review of the 
record, reversed the Appeals Examiner's decision and concluded that Thrall had voluntarily quit 
her job without good cause connected with her employment, thus, she is not entitled to benefits. 
R., Vol. I, pp. 17-26. Thrall filed a timely appeal of the Commission's decision with this Court. 
R., Vol. I, pp. 27-30 (original Notice of Appeal); R., Vol. I, pp. 34-37 (Amended Notice of 
Appeal). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Thrall incorrectly frames the bulk of issues she has raised on appeal as questions oflaw, 
and she erroneously contends that these legal issues may be reviewed de nova or for abuse of 
4 
discretion. 2 See Op. Br., at p. 4 (framing issues on appeal as whether Commission erred as a 
matter oflaw or abused its discretion when issuing certain rulings). However, the bulk of rulings 
Thrall challenges on appeal, specifically, the Commission's ruling that she voluntarily quit, that 
she did not have good cause to quit and that her errors on the job constituted misconduct, are all 
factual findings made by the Commission that may not be disturbed on appeal as long as they are 
supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. See Welch v. Cowles 
Publ'g Co., 127 Idaho 361,363, 900 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1995). As a consequence, these issues 
Thrall has raised on appeal should more appropriately be framed as follows: 
1) Whether substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's 
finding that Thrall voluntarily quit her employment without good cause; and 
2) Assuming Thrall was discharged (as opposed to voluntarily quitting her 
employment), whether substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's 
finding that she was discharged for misconduct. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court's scope of review is 
limited to questions of law, and this Court may not disturb the Commission's factual findings 
when they are supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. See Idaho 
2 On appeal of the Commission's decision concerning unemployment benefits, questions 
of law are reviewed de nova, not for abuse of discretion. Current v. Haddons Fencing, Inc., 152 
Idaho 10, 12,266 P.3d 485,487 (2011). 
5 
Const., Art. V, § 9; Bringman v. New Albertsons, Inc., Id. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 40232, *3 (Aug. 
4, 2014). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 
1265, 1269 (2003). In reviewing the Commission's factual findings, this Court should "not 
consider re-weighing the evidence or whether it would have drawn different conclusions from 
the evidence presented." Current, 152 Idaho at 13, 266 P.3d at 488. The Commission's 
conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of evidence should not be disturbed unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Buckham v. Idaho Elk's Rehab. Hosp., 141 Idaho 338, 340, 109 P.3d 726, 
728 (2005). "All facts and inferences [ should] be viewed by this Court in a light most favorable 
to the prevailing party before the Commission," which is St. Luke's in the present matter. See 
Current, 152 Idaho at 13, 266 P.3d at 488. 
IV. IDAHO'S EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LAW 
This appeal arises under Idaho's Employment Security Law, Idaho Code§ 72-1301 et 
seq., which provides a statutory process to obtain unemployment compensation benefits by Idaho 
workers who become "unemployed through no fault of their own." I.C. § 72-1302. Under this 
Act, "an unemployment compensation benefit claimant bears the burden of proving his or her 
eligibility for benefits." Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 417, 614 P.2d 955, 957 
(1980). To obtain unemployment benefits, a claimant must prove "all necessary information 
pertinent to eligibility," including the cause of his or her unemployment. See I.C. § 72-1366(1), 
(5)-(10); Bringman, Id. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 40232, *4; see also Hine v. Twin Falls Cnty., 114 
6 
Idaho 244,245, 755 P.2d 1282, 1283 (1988) ("The burden of proving and establishing statutory 
eligibility for unemployment benefits rests with the claimaint."). 
A claimant is ineligible for benefits if his unemployment is "due to the fact that he left his 
employment voluntarily without good cause connected with his employment, or ... he was 
discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment." I.C. § 72-1366(5). "[T]he 
claimant bears the burden of establishing good cause when she has voluntarily terminated her 
employment." Hine, 114 Idaho at 245, 755 P.2d at 1283. "Whether a claimant voluntarily quit a 
job for good cause in connection with the employment is a question of fact" to be determined by 
the Commission. Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343,347, 63 P.3d 469,473 (2003). Similarly, 
the claimant bears the initial burden of proving she was discharged; once the claimant has 
satisfied this burden, to preclude an award of benefits, the burden shifts to the employer to prove 
the employee was discharged for misconduct in connection with her employment. Johnson v. 
Idaho Central Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867, 869, 908 P.2d 560, 562 (1995). "Whether an 
employee's behavior constitutes misconduct is a factual determination" to be determined by the 
Commission and must be upheld on appeal, unless not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Harris v. Elec. Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3, 105 P.3d 267,269 (2004). 
The term "misconduct," as that term is used in the Act, has been interpreted by Idaho 
courts to mean "willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of 
the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to 
expect of his employees." Johns v. S.H Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544,548,307 P.2d 217,219 
(1957). This standard has been codified under IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02, which provides: 
7 
Misconduct that disqualifies a claimant for benefits must be 
connected with the claimant's employment and involve one of the 
following: 
a. Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful, intentional 
disregard of the employer's interest. 
b. Violation of Reasonable Rules. A deliberate violation 
of the employer's reasonable rules. 
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged 
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior which 
the employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no 
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional or 
deliberate. The claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. 
The test for misconduct in 'standard of behavior cases' is as 
follows: 
i. Whether claimant's conduct fell below the standard of 
behavior expected by the employer; and 
ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively 
reasonable in the particular case. 
(Emphasis added). "In order to be reasonable, an employer's expectation should flow naturally 
from the employment relationship or be communicated to the employee." Locker v. How Soel, 
Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 700, 263 P.3d 750, 754 (2011). Whether a claimant has disregarded the 
standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect from its employees, and whether 
the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in a particular case are factual 
determinations to be made by the Commission. Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 
279, 787 P.2d 263,265 (1990). 
In the present case, the Commission found that Thrall voluntarily quit her employment 
without good cause and, thus, is not entitled to benefits. Alternatively, the Commission found 
that, even if the facts surrounding Thrall's termination can be construed as a forced resignation 
8 
and, therefore, a discharge, Thrall was discharged for misconduct; thus, she is not entitled to 
benefits. As explained below, these rulings, which Thrall challenges on appeal, are factual 
determinations supported by substantial and competent evidence; thus, the Commission's 
decision denying benefits must be upheld. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Substantial and Competent Evidence Exists to Support the Commission's Finding 
that Thrall Voluntarily Quit Her Employment Without Good Cause. 
As previously noted, Thrall, as the claimant, bears the initial burden of proving she was 
discharged. Johnson, 127 Idaho at 869, 908 P.2d at 562. The Commission held that she was not 
discharged, rather, she voluntarily quit and that she did so without good cause connected with 
her employment. R., Vol. I, pp. 20-22, 25. Whether a claimant voluntarily quit with good cause, 
or whether she was discharged, are factual determinations that may not be disturbed on appeal if 
they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 
347, 63 P.3d at 473; Johnson, 127 Idaho at 869, 908 P.2d at 562. Because substantial and 
competent evidence exists to support the Commission's finding that Thrall voluntarily quit 
without good cause connected to her employment, Thrall's contention otherwise must be 
rejected. 
As a threshold matter, Thrall argues in her opening brief that the Commission made an 
error in law when it concluded that a forced resignation is not a discharge. Op. Br., at pp. 6-9. 
However, this is not what the Commission held. Rather, the Commission held that Thrall chose 
to resign, implying she was not forced to resign. R., Vol. I, p. 20. Thrall herself appears to 
acknowledge that choosing to resign to avoid a potential/possible discharge may be considered a 
9 
voluntary quit; whereas, an employee who is given no choice but to be fired, who then quits to 
avoid the imminent discharge, may, in effect, constitute a discharge. Op. Br., at p. 8. Courts in 
other jurisdictions recognize this distinction. See In the Matter of the Claim of M Reed, 590 
N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (denying benefits, holding that quitting in anticipation 
of a future discharge is a voluntary quit without good cause); Ganter v. Unemployment Comp. 
Bd. of Review, 723 A.2d 272,273 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (acknowledging that employee's 
resignation, which was done in part to avoid a potential discharge, was a voluntary termination). 
As previously noted, the Commission here concluded that Thrall's separation was a 
voluntary quit because she "chose to resign," meaning she was not coerced to resign. R., Vol. I, 
p. 20. This finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. For example, both of 
Thrall's supervisors who were present during her separation meeting testified that they never 
expressly told Thrall that she would face immediate termination if she did not resign. Tr., p. 12, 
L. 11 - p. 13, L. 21; Tr., p. 17, LL. 17-25 (Sergeant testimony); Tr., p. 19, LL. 12-20 (Miranda 
testimony). 3 Instead, as they testified, the parties discussed at length whether Thrall's 
resignation would be in her best interest (Tr., p. 12, L. 11 - p. 13, L. 21; Tr., p. 17, LL. 17-22 
(Sergeant testimony))--this fact alone suggests that Thrall was weighing her options and that she, 
in fact, had options to weigh. The fact that there may be conflicting evidence in the record that 
3 Even though Thrall's supervisors acknowledged that it was their intent to discharge 
Thrall that day if Thrall did not resign, the supervisors consistently testified that Thrall was not 
10 
this Court could rely upon to reach an opposite conclusion (i.e., that Thrall was coerced to 
resign) does not warrant a reversal of the Commission's factual finding. Because there is 
evidence in the record that a reasonable person could rely upon to conclude that Thrall was not 
coerced, but that she consciously chose to resign because, weighing her options, she thought it 
would be in her best interest, the Commission's finding of a voluntary quit must be upheld. 
Thrall also argues that the Commission erred by concluding that Thrall bore the burden of 
proving that her termination was not due to misconduct, and that imposing such a burden on 
Thrall is in direct conflict with well-established Idaho law, which imposes the burden of proving 
employee misconduct on the employer. Op. Br., at pp. 9-10. Even if the Commission did 
impose the burden of proving misconduct on the wrong party (which is not what actually 
occurred below), the Commission's doing so constituted harmless error, which does not warrant 
a reversal on appeal. As explained in the next section, there is substantial and competent 
evidence in the record that, assuming Thrall was in fact discharged, her discharge was for 
misconduct, which precludes her from recovering unemployment benefits. Where there is 
substantial evidence of misconduct in the record, determining who bore the burden of placing 
that evidence in the record in the first place is a moot issue at this point. 
Furthermore, when reviewing what the Commission actually concluded in this regard, it 
is clear that the Commission effectively concluded that Thrall had failed to demonstrate, as she 
told of this fact in their October 4 meeting. Tr., p. 13, LL. 12-21 (Sergeant testimony); Tr., p. 19, 
LL. 12-20 (Miranda testimony). 
11 
was required to do under Idaho law, that her termination, whether it was deemed a voluntary quit 
or a discharge, occurred through no fault of her own. In other words, that her termination of 
employment was not the result of her employee-related misconduct--or, if deemed a quit, that she 
had good cause to quit. In this regard, the Commission effectively equated evidence 
demonstrating a lack of employee-misconduct with evidence showing the existence of good 
cause. R., Vol. I, p. 22 This is hardly an egregious error warranting reversal, where this Court 
did the same thing in Hine. See Hine, 114 Idaho at 246, 755 P.2d at 1284 (concluding that 
claimant's conviction for embezzling funds proved she did not have "good cause" for leaving her 
employment voluntarily, since her conviction was based upon her own actions and it would, in 
fact, have been appropriate grounds for the employer to discharge her for "misconduct" in 
connection with her employment). Regardless, as previously noted, any error oflaw that may 
have occurred in this regard is harmless where there is substantial and competent evidence in the 
record that Thrall, if discharged, was discharged for misconduct in connection with her 
employment. 
B. Alternatively, Substantial and Competent Evidence Exists to Support the 
Commission's Finding that Thrall Was Discharged For Misconduct. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the Commission's finding that Thrall voluntarily 
quit her employment without good cause constitutes clear error, the Commission's decision 
denying benefits must still be upheld, where there is substantial and competent evidence in the 
record to support the Commission's alternate finding that Thrall was discharged for misconduct 
in connection with her employment. 
12 
As explained in the Commission's written decision (R., Vol. I, p. 22), the underlying 
facts in this case require the Court to apply the "standard of behavior" test for misconduct as set 
forth in ID APA and governing Idaho case law--a characterization that Thrall herself does not 
appear to challenge. Op. Br., at p. 11. Characterizing this case as a "standard of behavior" case 
is proper, given that the present case does not involve a finding that Thrall engaged in either a 
willful, intentional disregard of her employer's interests, or a deliberate violation of her 
employer's reasonable rules, which are alternative definitions of "misconduct" for purposes of 
Idaho's Employment Security Law. IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.a & .02.b. The "standard of 
behavior" test for misconduct, as previously noted, applies if 
the alleged misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior 
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no 
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional or deliberate. 
The claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct in 
'standard of behavior cases' is as follows: 
i. Whether claimant's conduct fell below the standard of 
behavior expected by the employer; and 
ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively 
reasonable in the particular case. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c (emphasis added). The IDOL regulations make it clear, however, that 
"[m]ere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure of good performance as the result of 
inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, isolated instances of ordinary negligence, or good faith 
errors in judgment or discretion are not considered misconduct connected with employment." 
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.03. Thrall relies on this exception to the regulatory definition of 
misconduct to argue that the Commission's finding of misconduct is erroneous because the only 
13 
evidence in the record suggests that, at most, her mistakes or en-ors were nothing more than 
"ordinary inadvertencies made during good faith efforts to complete her work duties" --or, in 
other words, her mistakes constituted nothing more than ordinary negligence. Op. Br., at p. 12. 
The flaw in this argument is that it is not an accurate characterization of the evidence. 
Rather, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the patient identification en-ors Thrall made 
were not "isolated instances of ordinary negligence," IDAP A 09. 01.30.2 7 5. 03 ( emphasis added); 
rather, they were repeated and occurred throughout a six-month period. Tr., p. 14, L. 18-p. 15, 
L. 6; R. Vol. I, p. 18. Other jurisdictions with similar regulatory definitions and exceptions as 
those quoted above recognize that persistent negligence, in spite of prior warnings given, can 
amount to misconduct that precludes an award of unemployment benefits. See, e.g., In the 
Matter of the Claim of J. Nicholas, 804 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that 
substantial evidence supported finding that nurse practitioner/claimant's employment was 
terminated due to disqualifying misconduct, where although claimant characterized her conduct 
as a "mistake" which did not rise to the level of misconduct, she agreed her notation in medical 
chart did not accurately reflect the procedure performed and she could have been more thorough, 
and claimant had previously been warned about her job performance and notified that any further 
indiscretions could lead to termination); In the Matter of tht Claim of A. Mitch, 669 N.Y.S.2d 73 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (recognizing that persistent negligence in spite of prior warnings can 
constitute misconduct). Here, it is undisputed that Thrall was given numerous prior warnings 
that her job was in jeopardy for the identification en-ors she had made. Tr., p. 14, LL. 18-24; R., 
Vol. I, p. 18. In light of these prior warnings, even if Thrall's patient identification en-ors could 
14 
be construed a mere negligence (and what a dangerous precedent that would be), this Court 
should nonetheless conclude that Thrall's persistence in committing these err~rs, despite the 
warnings, constituted misconduct disqualifying her for benefits. Indeed, such a ruling would be 
consistent with IDAPA 09.01.30.275.03, which only makes an exception for "isolated" instances 
of negligence. 
Additionally, this Court should not overlook the fact that Thrall was working in the 
medical field, where reliable and accurate laboratory results are critical to ensure patient health 
and safety, which comprises the very heart of St. Luke's business purpose. Other jurisdictions, 
when determining whether misconduct has occurred, consider not only the reasonableness of the 
employer's rules, but also the nature of the employer's business and its effect on the public. In 
particular, when a claimant violates an employer's policies or procedures implemented in a 
hospital or medical setting, some courts impose a higher standard of behavior or expectations 
that the claimant must satisfy in light of the hospital's duty to its patients. See Holly v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 617 A.2d 80, 83-84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that 
phlebotomist's misidentification of a patient's blood sample, in violation of hospital's procedure 
for patient identification and labelling of specimens, despite progressive discipline for three prior 
infractions, constituted misconduct which rendered the phlebotomist ineligible for 
unemployment benefits; phlebotomist was fully aware of her hospital employer's identification 
procedure and could be held to a high standard of behavior in light of the hospital's duty to its 
patients). The court in Holly specifically recognized that, because hospital employees may be 
held to a higher standard of behavior, a hospital employee's "inadvertent mistakes" should be 
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deemed as willful misconduct disqualifying the employee from receiving unemployment 
benefits. Id. at 83. This Court should adopt the rationale of the court in Holly and conclude that, 
in light of the nature of St. Luke's business and its effect on the public, Thrall's patient 
identification errors--even if construed as inadvertent mistakes--constitutes misconduct that 
disqualifies her from receiving unemployment benefits, where said errors could have endangered 
the life and safety of St. Luke's patients. 
Finally, Thrall's reliance on Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 556 
P.2d 859 (1976), is misplaced. Thrall cites certain language in Wroble as support for her 
argument that merely making a rule of conduct and demonstrating that an employee has violated 
that rule of conduct is not, in itself, "misconduct" sufficient to defeat an award of unemployment 
benefits. Op. Br., at p. 12. Wroble, however, is distinguishable for the following reasons and 
should be disregarded by this Court. First, unlike the present case, Wroble involved an 
employee's deliberate violation of the employer's rules, which is not the circumstances here. 
More importantly, the employee violation in Wroble involved a failure by the employee to 
mention on his job application prior jobs the employee had held. 97 Idaho at 901, 556 P.2d at 
860. Thus, the misconduct alleged in Wroble did not necessarily work to undermine the very 
nature of the employer's business like the misconduct at issue here did. Given that the degree of 
misconduct at issue here is much more severe than that at issue in Wroble, and that the present 
case arguably involves a higher standard of conduct to be applied to medical personnel, this 
Court should conclude that Wroble is not instructive. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the Commission's decision that 
Thrall is ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
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